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Abstract—The German federal constitutional court ruled, in
2009, that elections had to have a public nature. EasyVote,
a promising hybrid electronic voting system for conducting
elections with complex voting rules and huge ballots, meets this
requirement. Two assumptions need to hold, however. The first is
that voters will verify the human-readable part of the EasyVote
ballot and detect discrepancies. Secondly, that electoral officials
will act to verify that the human-readable part of the ballot is
identical to the machine-readable part, and that they, too, will
detect discrepancies. The first assumption was tested in prior
work, so in this paper we examine the viability of the second
assumption.
We developed an EasyVote tallying component and conducted
a user study to determine whether electoral officials would detect
discrepancies. The results of our user study show that our
volunteer electoral officials did not detect all of the differences,
which challenges the validity of the second assumption.
Based on these findings we proceeded to propose two alterna-
tive designs of the EasyVote ballot: (1) In contrast to the original
EasyVote ballot, the human-readable part highlights only the
voter’s direct selections in orange, i.e. votes that are automatically
distributed by selecting a party are not highlighted; (2) The
second alternative includes only the voter’s direct selections and
highlights them in orange. Both alternatives reduce the number of
required manual comparisons and should consequently increase
the number of discrepancies detected by election officials. We
evaluated both alternatives in an online survey with respect to
ease of verification and understandability of the cast vote, i.e.
verifying that the human-readable part contained the voter’s
selections and understanding the impact (distribution of votes)
of the corresponding selections.
The results of the online survey show that both alternatives
are significantly better than the original EasyVote ballot with re-
spect to ease of verification and understandability. Furthermore,
the first alternative is significantly better than the second with
respect to understandability of the cast vote, and no significant
difference was found between the alternatives with respect to ease
of verification of the cast vote.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The German saying “different countries, different customs”
holds true for elections, which can be very different between
and even within countries. Some elections, like parliamentary
elections in Estonia or Germany have very simple voting rules
and small ballots. Voters can select 1 out of n-candidates,
where n is a relatively small number between two and 20.
Other elections, like parliamentary and European elections in
Luxembourg, parliamentary elections in Belgium and local
elections in Germany (e.g. Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse),
have very complex voting rules and huge ballots. In this paper
we focus on the local elections in Hesse, because we were
able to access original materials, e.g. ballots, tallying software
and training presentations, used in the 2011 elections. In these
elections voters can cast up to 93 votes1 depending on the
size of the district; usually more than ten parties and more
than 450 candidates participate, which results in huge ballots,
nearly the size of an A02 sheet of paper (Size: 27” x 35”).
Furthermore, voters can select a party (votes are automatically
assigned to the candidates of the selected party according to the
list order), and cross out candidates they do not like. They can
perform vote splitting (cast votes for candidates of different
parties) and cumulative voting (cast up to three votes for each
candidate). Such complexity introduces challenges regarding
both vote casting and tallying processes. In the vote casting
process, voters might unintentionally spoil their vote, due to
the complex voting rules. Furthermore, the tallying process is
very time intensive and likely to be error prone, because of
the combination of complex voting rules and huge ballots.
In order to address these challenges and improve the
situation for both voters and poll workers, in particular for local
elections in Hesse, Volkamer et al. [2] proposed an electronic
voting system, called EasyVote. The EasyVote system can be
briefly described as follows: 1) Voters prepare their ballots
on a voting device, which prints their selections. The printed
ballot contains voters’ selections in a human- and machine-
readable (a plaintext QR-Code) format. 2) Voters deposit their
ballots into the ballot box. 3) Ballots are tallied automatically,
by scanning the QR-Codes on the printouts.
Budurushi et al. [3] evaluated a number of electronic
voting systems with respect to their feasibility for use in
elections with complex voting rules and huge ballots. They
1This number depends on the the number of available seats, which also
limits the number of candidates nominated by a party.
2A0 according to [1].
report that, with respect to the public nature of elections3 and
secrecy legal requirements, the EasyVote system supported
the complex local elections in Hesse better than the other
systems. Henning et al. [4] analysed the EasyVote system from
a legal perspective and showed that it complied with German
requirements for local elections in Hesse.4 Both analyses [3],
[4] rely on the following assumptions being true: (1) Voters
will act to verify the correctness of the human-readable part
of their ballots; (2) Voters will detect discrepancies; (3) Elec-
toral officials will verify that the human-readable matches the
machine-readable part (QR-Code); (4) Electoral officials will
detect discrepancies. However, before EasyVote can be used in
practice, the validity of these assumptions has to be verified.
With respect to the first and second assumptions, Budurushi
et al. [5] showed that the number of voters that verified
their printouts and detected discrepancies could be increased
significantly if voters were provided with pre-printed, “just-in-
time” verification instructions.
Thus, in the first part of this paper we focus our attention
on the actions of electoral officials during the tallying process.
We implemented a tallying component prototype based on the
EasyVote system. The tallying process itself could, in general,
be achieved using different techniques: (1) by scanning the
printouts with different scanners manufactured by different
manufacturers (trust distribution), or (2) by scanning printouts
and performing either risk-limiting audits described in [6] and
[7], or the Bayesian method described in [8], or (3) by scanning
each ballot and comparing the human-readable printout with
the details on the screen (generated from the QR-Code). We
implemented the latter process, as this complies with the legal
requirements [4]. We do not know whether the other techniques
are aligned with the public nature of elections, because, to the
best of our knowledge, no legal analysis has been conducted
yet. Since electoral officials have to scan a large number of
individual ballots, one after the other, the accuracy of the
process becomes important and therefore should be evaluated.
Accuracy is particularly important, because it relies on human
attention, which is notoriously unreliable [9], [10]. This is
especially the case when the prevalence of the target to be
noticed is low [11], [12], when the searcher has to look for
multiple different targets at the same time [13] and when the
size of the area to be searched is large [14]. All of these are
true for the EasyVote ballots so it seems important to test the
impact of this well-known human limitation on the checking
required during the EasyVote tallying process. Therefore in a
user study, we evaluated the accuracy of the EasyVote tallying
component by intentionally introducing manipulated printouts,
i.e. printouts where the human-readable part did not match
the machine-readable part (the data stored in the QR-Code).
3This principle was introduced by the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany in 2009, and states that it must be possible for the citizen to verify
the essential steps in the election act and in the ascertainment of the results
reliably and without special expert knowledge, i.e. each election step must be
transparent for the voter.
4As the legal evaluation is in German, we outline here the most important
conclusions: (1) Voters can verify their vote without any specialist knowledge.
(2) Voters are not required to rely on the system’s integrity. (3) The system
enables an automatic tally of single votes, and also a full manual tallying
of votes, similar to the traditional one. (4) The human-readable part is the
deciding factor regarding the tallying process. (5) The system strengthens the
principle of the “public nature of elections”, since on the one hand voters can
better understand the impact of their selections, and on the other hand the
tallying process might be faster and more accurate than the traditional one.
Note that the goal was to evaluate the accuracy of the actions
of electoral officials during the implemented tallying process,
thus we assumed a compromised vote casting component
and an honest and correctly implemented EasyVote tallying
component. The results of this study show that this way of
effecting the tallying in EasyVote is not fully accurate as we
rely on human ability to detect differences and our participant
“electoral officials” did not detect all the manipulations we
introduced during their scanning and verification process. The
study also revealed that it will be necessary either to improve
the EasyVote system or to relax the legal requirements.
Based on these findings, in the second part of this paper
we focused on improving the process and proposed two alter-
native EasyVote ballot designs: (1) In contrast to the original
EasyVote ballot, the human-readable part highlights the voter’s
direct selections in orange, i.e. votes that are automatically
distributed by selecting a party are not highlighted; (2) The sec-
ond alternative includes only the voter’s direct selections and
highlights them in orange. Both alternatives reduce the number
of required manual comparisons and should consequently
increase the number of discrepancies detected by the poll
workers. We evaluated the alternatives in an online survey with
respect to ease of verification and understandability of the cast
vote, i.e. verifying that the human-readable part contains the
voter’s selections and understanding the impact (distribution of
votes) of the corresponding selections. The results of the online
survey show that the alternatives are significantly better than
the original EasyVote ballot with respect to ease of verification
and understandability of the cast vote. Furthermore, the first
alternative is significantly better than the second with respect to
understandability of the cast vote, and no significant difference
was found between the alternatives with respect to ease of
verification of the cast vote.
II. BACKGROUND
We first explain the traditional tallying process in the local
Hesse elections. The paper ballots used in the traditional local
elections in Hesse are shown and elaborated on in Figure 1.
The traditional tallying process in the local elections in Hesse
comprises two phases. Both phases are led by an electoral
official who gives instructions to other electoral officials and
observes the process. In the first phase, at the end of the
election day, electoral officials perform the following steps:
• Open the ballot boxes, count the total number of cast
ballots and compare it with the total number of marked
voters in the electoral register.
• Divide the ballots into four categories: 1) Only party
header is marked 2) Candidates and/or a party header
are marked 3) Invalid 4) Not assignable to 1), 2) or
3).
• Check that ballots are assigned to the correct category.
• Divide and count the 1st category by parties (first
intermediate result).
• Discuss and assign each single ballot of the 4th to the
1st, 2nd or 3rd category.
• Manually recompute the intermediate election result,
based on the 1st and 3rd category.
Fig. 1: Paper ballot of the local elections in Hesse in 2011.
(Size: 27” x 35”)
The second phase of the tallying process takes place the
day after the election. This phase is supported electronically
by special purpose software. The software used by traditional
local elections in Hesse is called PC-Wahl.5 During this phase
only ballots from the 2nd category, i.e. ballots that contain
marked candidates and/or a party header, are tallied. Electoral
officials perform the following steps:
• Electoral officials enter the intermediate result from
the first phase.
• First five ballots are entered and recorded into the PC-
Wahl interface (Figure 2).
• Manually tally the first five ballots.
• Compare the electronic result with the manual result.6
• Enter and record the rest of the ballots into the
corresponding PC-Wahl interface.
• Electronically compute the final election result, and
sign the printed disposition.
The process of entering and recording ballots via the cor-
responding PC-Wahl interface is performed by three electoral
officials. One electoral official narrates the marks from the
ballot and a second enters them into the PC-Wahl interface. A
third electoral official verifies that the first and second electoral
officials have performed this correctly.
Note that electoral officials who participate in the second
phase of the tallying process are employees of the corre-
sponding electoral office and/or municipality. Hence, they
have relatively high technical expertise. Furthermore, they
participate in a theoretical training workshop regarding the PC-
Wahl software. The workshop lasts approximately 30 minutes,
and electoral official can practice if they wish to, in order to
ensure their competence.
5http://www.pcwahl.de/.
6This check only serves as a self-control for electoral officials, rather than
checking the correctness of PC-Wahl.
Fig. 2: Ballot entering and recording interface of PC-Wahl.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we introduce and describe the different
steps of the implemented EasyVote tallying process. The
EasyVote ballots that need to be tallied are shown in Figure
3. Afterwards, we present the interfaces of the implemented
prototype.
Fig. 3: The EasyVote paper ballot.
A. Tallying Process
The implemented EasyVote tallying process comprises the
following steps: (1) Open the ballot boxes, count the total
number of cast ballots and compare it with the total number of
marked voters in the electoral register. (2) Scan each individual
ballot. (3) Electronically compute the final election result, and
sign the printed disposition.
Since the EasyVote ballots are electronically prepared and
printed in a pre-defined layout, format and font, the ballots
could feasibly be scanned by using Optical Character Recog-
nition (OCR) scanners. However, for scanning each individual
ballot we decided to use QR-Codes scanners, as originally
proposed by Volkamer et al. [2], based on the following
general advantages of QR-Code scanners:
• QR-Code scanners provide a much higher error cor-
rection level and therefore are more accurate.
• QR-Code scanners can be used for all type of ballots
(universal encoding), while OCR scanners need to be
configured and maintained for each type of ballot.
Hence, the process of scanning and counting an individual
ballot, shown in Figure 4, consists of the following steps: (1)
Pick up a ballot. (2) Scan the QR-Code. (3) Verify and confirm
that the scanned information matches the human-readable part
of the ballot. (4) Repeat process with the next ballot.
Fig. 4: Scanning and counting ballots with EasyVote.
Note that if we used OCR scanners the human-readable
part is also the machine-readable part. This prevents the vote
casting component from manipulating the machine-readable
part, because voters would be able to detect the manipu-
lation. However, in order to ensure the correctness of the
scanning/counting process, electoral officials are still required
to fully verify/examine the scanned ballot against the printout
(EasyVote ballot). If we assume that electoral officials are
required to detect all possible discrepancies, it makes no
difference whether these are introduced by the vote casting
or tallying components.
B. Interfaces of the Prototype
The EasyVote tallying component proposed by Volkamer
et al. [2] uses two monitors (two different interfaces) for the
tallying process. The first monitor, presented in step three on
Figure 4, displays and enables the verification of each individ-
ual scanned ballot. The second monitor displays intermediate
election results after scanning, verifying and confirming each
individual ballot. This enables electoral officials and the gen-
eral public to verify that each individual ballot is correctly
added to the election result.
Figure 5 presents the implemented interface for the first
monitor, while Figure 6 presents the implemented interface
for the second monitor.
IV. USER STUDY - ACCURACY EVALUATION
In this section we describe the user study, in which we
evaluated the prototype with respect to accuracy. The goal
of the study was to find out if the implemented EasyVote
tallying component is 100% accurate, i.e. that discrepancies
where the QR-Code does not match the human-readable part
Fig. 5: Scanning and verifying the content of the current ballot.
Fig. 6: Overview on the intermediate election result.
can always (in any case and by any participant) be detected.
We intentionally introduced manipulated printouts, in order to
check if participants detected the discrepancies.
A. Preliminary Considerations and Materials
In the user study we only focused on the process of
scanning an individual ballot and verifying that the human-
readable part matches the machine-readable part. Although
by verifying intermediate results we might also be able to
detect discrepancies, we assume that if participants cannot
detect all discrepancies during the scanning and verifying
process, they will also not detect further discrepancies while
verifying intermediate results. Thus, for this study we assumed
a compromised vote casting component and, an honest and
correctly implemented EasyVote tallying component. Note that
in practice the tallying component is not assumed trustworthy,
as different mechanisms can be used to detect a malicious
tallying component, for instance the tallying component pro-
vides a cryptographic commitment after each scanned ballot
or a hash chain, or by videotaping both monitors at the same
time. Afterwards, random checks can be performed to ensure
the correctness of the election result.
Furthermore, one of the most well-known challenges in
the area of usable security is that you cannot communicate
the primary goal of the study to participants without biasing
them [15]. If participants know the primary goal of the study,
they may act in a manner perceived as appropriate, and change
their behaviour [16]. Therefore we told all participants in the
user study that the goal was to evaluate the usability of the
EasyVote tallying component. This was necessary so that the
participants would not be biased in their behaviour.
The materials required to conduct the user study are listed
here. For the materials from the local elections in Hesse we
collaborated with the local authorities.
• Training workshop presentations for the PC-Wahl soft-
ware.
• 189 original electronically filled in ballots from the
local elections in Hesse 2011. They were split as
follows: 94 from the 1st, 89 from the 2nd and 6 from
the 3rd category.7
• The implemented EasyVote tallying component.
• Training workshop presentations for the EasyVote
system. We created these presentations based on those
for the PC-Wahl software.
• 189 EasyVote ballots. These ballots were electroni-
cally created, and duplicated the 189 traditional bal-
lots.
• Five EasyVote test ballots to be used during the
training phase: Three ballots with candidates and party
header marked, and two ballots that also contained
crossed out candidates. Two of the five ballots required
corresponding corrections by the participants.
B. Study Design
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the implemented
EasyVote tallying component we manipulated the QR-Codes
of the EasyVote ballots. Hence, when scanning the QR-Code of
a manipulated ballot participants should detect a discrepancy
between the EasyVote ballot and the data displayed on the
screen. As we do not aim to change, but rather to improve the
tallying process for local elections in Hesse, participants were
required to tally only ballots of the 2nd category, i.e. a total
of 89 ballots that contain votes assigned to candidates and/or
a selected party header.
C. Manipulations: Introducing Discrepancies
While manipulating the QR-Codes of the EasyVote ballots
is technically trivial, we first had to solve the following
challenges: 1) Identify all possible manipulations that lead
to a difference between the printed human-readable part on
the ballot and the data displayed on the monitor; 2) Select
an adequate set of manipulations; 3) Introduce an adequate
number of manipulations, in order to not directly reveal the
study goal; 4) Decide how to randomly add manipulations to
7Refer to section II for the description of the different categories.
ballots; 5) Decide how to introduce the manipulations into the
ballot set randomly.
By performing a systematic analysis we identified 36
possible manipulations that we classified in the following
five manipulation categories: 1) Changing only vote distri-
bution (7 manipulations); 2) Change candidate names (14
manipulations); 3) Changing party, including its candidates (11
manipulations); 4) Invalidating a valid ballot (2 manipulations);
5) Validating an invalid ballot (1 manipulation).
In order to select a reasonable set of manipulations, we
defined the following criteria: 1) Detecting the manipulation
requires a full and careful comparison of the EasyVote ballot
and monitor; 2) Manipulation should be hard to detect. This
led us to the following adequate manipulation set:
• Remove votes from a candidate and assign them to
another candidate (1st manipulation category).
• Remove votes from a candidate and do not re-assign
them (1st manipulation category).
• Remove a candidate and insert another candidate
instead (2nd manipulation category).
• Remove a candidate (2nd manipulation category).
• Remove a party, including its candidates (3rd manip-
ulation category)
This set also covers the manipulations used in previous studies,
refer to [17] and [18].
Furthermore, since we were restricted by the number of
ballots used in this study we manipulated only 5 out of the
89 ballots. In this way we covered all manipulation categories
and introduced a reasonable number of manipulations relative
to the number of ballots, such that participants would not guess
the primary study goal. We randomly selected 5 ballots and
introduced the manipulations according to a random permuta-
tion. Finally, we randomly introduced the manipulated ballots
into the set of all ballots. Note that each group was confronted
with the same manipulations, but in a different random order.
D. Experimental Design and Procedure
11 participants were randomly allocated to four different
groups. Three groups consisted of three participants, and one
group of two. Each group had to perform the following steps:
• Read and sign the agreement form for participating to
the study.
• Participate in the training workshop.
• Tally the 2nd category ballots with the implemented
prototype.
• Debrief.
Furthermore, we randomly assigned participants of a group
the following tasks: 1) Scanning (one participant had to scan
the ballot); 2) Verifying (two participants had to verify that the
human-readable part matches the machine-readable part). As
the last group consisted only of two participants, one of the
participants was randomly assigned to perform both tasks.
Note that the EasyVote tallying process proposed by Volka-
mer et al. [2] requires only two electoral officials. However,
we used the same setting as in the traditional local elections
in Hesse, thus assigning three instead of two participants
(electoral officials) to each group. The last group consisted
only of two participants, because one of them did not show
up.
E. Experimental Setup and Ethical Considerations
All experiments took place in our department. The venue
was equipped with tables, chairs and a projector. The projector
was used during the presentations in the training workshops.
All groups were provided with the necessary hardware equip-
ment, monitor(s), a computer on which the tallying software
was installed, and a printer.
An ethics commission at our university provides ethical
requirements for research involving humans. These require-
ments were met. All participants were told that all data would
be stored anonymously and used only for the purposes of the
experiment.
F. Recruiting and Sampling
The participants were recruited via e-mail, advertising in
social networks and flyers. The experiment had 11 randomly
selected participants (6 female, 5 male), age 19-57 years: 7
students from different subject areas and 4 employees of our
university. All participants were naı¨ve, with respect to the
content, since none had worked as an electoral official before.
Three different incentives encouraged participation: First, the
employees of our university were interested in science and
wanted to support our research. Second, 3 were psychology
students, who are required by their department to participate
in 30 hours of research studies. We compensated them with the
appropriate amount of hours. For the rest of the participants
we provided e10 per participant.
It is important to note that most of the participants were
university students who are very familiar with technology.
While they may not be representative of the larger “electoral
officials” population, they probably serve a best-case scenario
for what tallying performance could be.
G. Results
In this section we report the results regarding the dependent
variable “detected” that reflects the accuracy of the imple-
mented EasyVote tallying component. Table I summarises the
results of the study. “True” means that the discrepancy was
detected and corrected by the participants, while “False” means
that the discrepancy was not detected.
TABLE I: Summary of the accuracy evaluation.
Manipulation Group 1 / Group 2 / Group 3 / Group 4**/
categories* Position Position Position Position
1 False / 1 True / 34 True / 6 True / 59
2 True / 83 False / 75 True / 68 True / 8
3 True / 51 False / 36 True / 88 False / 89
4 False / 9 True / 67 True / 25 False / 3
5 True / 87 True / 46 False / 54 True / 36
* Refer to section II for the description of the different categories.
** This group consisted only of two participants.
The results of the accuracy evaluation show that none of the
groups detected all introduced discrepancies. Furthermore, the
results indicate that detecting a discrepancy does not depend
on the position, or on whether others have previously been
detected, or on the specific manipulation category.
Note that due to these results, which already show that the
implemented EasyVote tallying component does not achieve
100% accuracy, we decided not to continue the user study,
i.e. not to include further groups (participants) enabling us to
achieve an adequate sample size that would allow to perform
various statistical tests.
V. ONLINE SURVEY - EASYVOTE BALLOT DESIGN
In this section we describe our online survey and present
the results. This survey is motivated by the results of the
user study reported in the first part of the paper. Hence, the
goal was to identify an alternative EasyVote ballot design.
On the one hand it ought to reduce the number of required
manual comparisons and consequently increase the number of
discrepancies detected by poll workers. On the other hand it
enables voters easily to verify their cast vote. We also report
on recruitment and sampling of participants.
A. Alternative EasyVote Ballots
In the survey we presented participants with two possible
EasyVote ballot designs (see Figure 7). In contrast to the
original EasyVote ballot, both alternatives introduce colour
as a new dimension. According to Braun and Silver [19],
the colour red conveys the highest level of perceived hazard
followed by orange, black, green and blue. Furthermore, Young
and Wogalter [20] found that with respect to memory times
print highlighted with orange was better remembered than
non-highlighted text. Moreover, since red is problematic for
a significant percentage of the male population due to colour
blindness, orange seemed the best choice.
The first alternative, in contrast to the original EasyVote
ballot, highlights the voter’s manual selections in orange.
The second alternative simplifies things even further, since
it eliminates everything except the voter’s manual selections
and these are still highlighted in orange. Hence, automatically
distributed votes, i.e. remaining votes that are assigned to the
candidates of a party by selecting the party header, are not
printed. The size of the printout remains the same, independent
of the voter’s selections.
Furthermore, in contrast to the original EasyVote ballot,
the machine-readable part (QR-Code) encodes only the voter’s
manual selections. Thus, the “adapted” EasyVote tallying com-
ponent implements the algorithm to automatically distribute
votes independently of the voter’s manual selections, rather
than only relying on the data stored in the QR-Code. Both
alternatives reduce the number of required manual comparisons
for both voters and electoral officials. However, in order to
ensure the correctness of the election result, we suggest that
electoral officials check the automatic distribution of votes
for a random set of ballots, i.e. verify the complete ballot
displayed/interpreted by the tallying component, rather than
only voter’s manual selections.
(a) The first alternative.
(b) The second alternative.
Fig. 7: The alternative EasyVote ballot designs
B. Design and Procedure
The survey consisted of four parts and was structured as
follows: (1) Participants were introduced to the local elections
in Hesse. They were asked whether they had previously cast
a vote in local Hesse or similar elections, and how often they
participated in local elections. (2) Participants were told how
many invalid votes were cast in the local elections in Hesse
in 2011. This percentage, (5.5%)8 was much higher than the
German federal elections in 2013 (on avarage 2.7%)9. Then
they were introduced to the EasyVote vote casting process.
(3) They were asked some general questions to assess the
comprehensibility of the EasyVote vote casting process. (4)
Participants were given a textual description of a cast vote, and
confronted with the original and the two alternative ballots. All
reflected the cast vote described in the text. Participants were
asked to rank the ballot types (original and alternatives) with
respect to ease of verification and understandability of the cast
vote, i.e. verifying that the human-readable part contains the
voters selections and understanding the impact (distribution of
votes) of the corresponding selections. We also collected some
demographic data (nationality, age, gender and education).
C. Recruiting and Sampling
The participants were recruited via e-mail, advertising in
social networks, flyers and by personal contact. 87 subjects
participated (35 female, 48 male, 4 others) between the ages
of 19-75 years. We removed 14 participants (3 female, 9
8http://www.statistik-hessen.de/K2011/EK1.htm, last accessed 10.08.2014
(in German).
9http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/BTW BUND 13/
ergebnisse/landesergebnisse/l06/, last accessed 10.08.2014.
male, 2 others) aged 22-75, because they did not answer
all questions with respect to the vote casting process with
the EasyVote voting system. The remaining 73 subjects (32
female, 39 male, 2 others) aged 19-65 comprised one partici-
pant with apprenticeship, four with a Ph.D. degree, five with
middle school qualification, seven with a B.Sc. degree, seven
with a technical college qualification, eight with a vocational
education, 15 with a Diploma/M.Sc. degree and 26 with a
high school qualification. Most (63) were Germans, four were
Austrians, 2 were Turkish, one Swiss and one did not provide
information about nationality. No incentives were provided,
thus participation was purely voluntary.
D. Results
Table II summarises the results with respect to understand-
ability of cast vote and Table III with respect to ease of
verification.
TABLE II: Understandability of cast vote.
Times of ranking
EasyVote Ballot First place Second place Third place
Original 5 27 41
First alternative 41 30 2
Second alternative 27 16 30
TABLE III: Ease of verification of cast vote.
Times of ranking
EasyVote Ballot First place Second place Third place
Original 6 18 49
First alternative 32 40 1
Second alternative 35 15 24
In order to measure the difference between the original
and the alternative designs of the EasyVote ballot we used the
Wilcoxon non-parametric test. The test shows a significant dif-
ference between the first alternative and the original EasyVote
ballot with respect to understandability, Z=-6.722; p < 0.01
and ease of verification, Z=-6.722; p < 0.01. A significant
difference is also found between the second alternative and
the original EasyVote ballot with respect to understandability,
Z=-2.891; p < 0.01 and ease of verification, Z=-4.205; p
< 0.01. Additionally, the first and second alternatives differ
significantly regarding understandability, Z=-3.673; p < 0.01
with a higher rank sum for the first alternative (1993.50).
No significant difference was found between both alternatives
regarding ease of verification.
Furthermore, we evaluated participants’ statements, on
a five-point Likert scale, concerning the advantages of the
EasyVote system compared to the traditional elections in
Hesse. Approximately 92% of the participants agreed or fully
agreed that the EasyVote system would support voters in such
complex elections, such as the local elections in Hesse. 64%
of the participants would be happy to use the EasyVote system
at the next local elections in Hesse. Around 80% of the
participants recognised or fully recognised the advantages of
the EasyVote system compared to traditional local elections
in Hesse, and think that the EasyVote system is a first step
in the right direction to introduce technology in the context of
legally-binding elections. Only one participant did not perceive
any advantages with respect to using the EasyVote system.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The focus of our research is on electronic voting systems
for elections with complex voting rules and huge ballots that
meet the German constitutional requirements, including the
principle of the public nature of elections. This principle
requires that voters should be able to verify all essential steps
of the election without technical knowledge. Therefore, in this
paper we considered the EasyVote [2] hybrid voting system,
which is supposed to meet those requirements. Because of the
public nature of elections, we focused on the tallying process
in which ballots are scanned individually and each ballot is
verified as correct before being tallied.
In the first part of this paper, we reported the results
of a user study carried out to evaluate the accuracy of the
implemented EasyVote tallying process. The main finding
is that the implemented tallying process cannot guarantee a
100% accurate election result since participants did not notice
all manipulations. Such human errors could be avoided by
automatically scanning all EasyVote ballots, i.e. implement-
ing a different tallying process. Furthermore, trust could be
increased either by risk-limiting audit techniques or by using
several independent scanners/tallying components. However,
this would decrease the extent to which the public nature
principle is implemented. This result shows that just because a
voting system meets the public nature requirement it does not
mean that discrepancies are detected or that underlying fraud
is necessarily revealed.
In the second part we reported the results of an online
survey, which evaluated two alternative EasyVote ballots de-
signs. Both alternatives were shown to reduce the number of
manual comparisons required and can be expected to increase
the number of discrepancies detected by the election officials.
The results of the online survey show that the first alterna-
tive design, where voters’ manual selections are additionally
highlighted in orange, differs significantly with the original
EasyVote ballot with respect to understandability and ease of
verification of the cast vote. Furthermore, the first and second
alternatives differ significantly regarding understandability. No
significant difference was found between the alternatives with
respect to ease of verification.
Thus, for future interdisciplinary research we will study
the reliability of mechanisms which comply with the principle
of the public nature of elections. We plan to repeat the user
study with the new EasyVote ballot design (first alternative),
and also to propose different techniques to improve detection
accuracy. Another open research question is to discover what
an acceptable rate of errors is, if indeed we have to accept that
some errors will remain undetected.
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